

## Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
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O R 291620Z MAY 77 ZFF 6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PARIS  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION USUN  
SECSTATE WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SECTO 05007

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, SF, IS, UR, SA, US  
SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF ISRAEL ON U.S. TALKS WITH  
SOVIETS AND SAUDIS

1. SUMMARY. THE SECRETARY MET WITH AMBASSADOR  
DINITZ MAY 28 TO BRIEF HIM ON GROMYKO AND FAHD TALKS,  
WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON AND ISRAELI DCM  
BAR-ON PARTICIPATING. THE SECRETARY SAID SOVIETS  
HAD PRESENTED NOTHING NEW, BUT GROMYKO DID AGREE  
MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SHOULD ESTABLISH REAL CONDITIONS  
OF PEACE. DURING FAHD VISIT WE HAD ASKED HOW SAUDIS  
RECONCILED THEIR CONCERN OVER MIDDLE EAST STABILITY  
WITH LIKELIHOOD PALESTINIAN STATE IF CREATED  
WOULD RADICALIZE AND COME UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE.  
FAHD HAD SAID IT WAS RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUDI ARABIA  
AND OTHER ARAB STATES IN AREA TO ENSURE THIS DID NOT  
HAPPEN. SAUDIS--AS HAD GROMYKO--STATED BELIEF PLO  
WOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL IF ISRAEL WOULD RECOGNIZE  
PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO HAVE INDEPENDENT STATE.  
FAHD WAS CONVINCED THAT WEST BANK-GAZA STATE WOULD  
NATURALLY DEVELOP CLOSE TIES WITH JORDAN AND THAT  
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BOTH ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD HAVE SECURE  
BORDERS. FAHD ASSERTED CONFRONTATION STATES WERE  
NOW IN AGREEMENT THERE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO BE  
INDEPENDENT WEST BANK-GAZA STATE WHICH WOULD THEN  
CHOOSE WHAT FEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS IT WANTED, BUT THE  
SECRETARY WAS NOT SURE JORDAN ACCEPTED THIS.  
DINITZ EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

OVER CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION OF JEWS IN USSR. THE SECRETARY REPLIED HE DID KNOW IF THERE WOULD BE ANY SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON SHARANSKIY AND BEGUN CASES. ANSWERING DINITZ, THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PODGORNYY'S FALL RESULTED FROM COMBINATION OF FACTORS AND DID NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT POLICY IMPLICATIONS. DINITZ UNDER INSTRUCTIONS VOICED CONCERN OVER WHITE HOUSE REFERENCE TO UNGA RESOLUTIONS 181 AND 194 IN EXPLANATION OF HISTORICAL RECORD BEHIND U.S. VIEW THAT PALESTINIANS SHOULD HAVE HOMELAND, STRESSED ISRAELI POSITION THAT UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 CONSTITUTED ONLY FRAMEWORK FOR MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOTED THESE RESOLUTIONS DID NOT CALL FOR PALESTINIAN HOMELAND, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES, OR REFUGEE COMPENSATION. DINITZ WAS GIVEN TEXT OF DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT OF MAY 27 AFFIRMING U.S. VIEW THAT RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 PROVIDE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HE SAID HAD HELPED END CONFUSION IN SITUATION. DINITZ CALLED FOR ALL CONCERNED TO RESERVE JUDGMENT ON ISRAELI POLICY UNTIL NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED, WITH WHICH THE SECRETARY AGREED. END SUMMARY.

2. THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO.

3. THE SECRETARY SAID ONLY TWO HOURS WERE DEVOTED TO MIDDLE EAST, AND REST OF TIME WAS CONCENTRATED ON SALT. SOVIETS HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON SECRET

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MIDDLE EAST. THEY REPEATED WHAT THEY HAD STATED OBLIQUELY BEFORE: PLO IN SOVIET ESTIMATION WOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN RETURN FOR ISRAELI RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO EXIST IN INDEPENDENT STATE. WE ADHERED TO OUR SINAI II AGREEMENT THAT SINCE PLO DID NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND DID NOT ACCEPT

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RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, WE WOULD HAVE NO CONVERSATIONS WITH PLO. WE STRESSED NEED FOR SETTLEMENT TO ESTABLISH REAL PEACE. PERHAPS MOST INTERESTING THING TO COME OUT OF TALKS WITH GROMYKO WAS FACT THAT HE AGREED IT ONLY FAIR AND PROPER THAT MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR PEACEFUL RELATIONS. SOVIET POSITION ON BORDERS AND PALESTINIAN ENTITY REMAINED ESSENTIALLY SAME, THERE SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT ENTITY, AND IF IT THEREAFTER CHOSE TO AFFILIATE ITSELF WITH JORDAN OR SYRIA OR BOTH, THIS WOULD BE UP TO THEM.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AND GROMYKO HAD TALKED ABOUT NEED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM IN SEARCH FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD WORK TOWARD RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE IN FALL. U.S. AND USSR WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL ON MONTHLY BASIS TO EXCHANGE ANY INFORMATION. SOVIETS NEEDED TO FEEL THEY WERE PLAYING ROLE. SOVIETS' PICTURE OF USSR'S APPEARANCE ON WORLD

SCENE WAS PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION FOR THEM. DINITZ  
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ASKED IF AMBASSADORIAL MEETINGS WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON OR MOSCOW. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WOULD DEPEND ON SUBJECT. HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO CALL IN DOBRYNIN AND HE ALSO MIGHT ASK AMBASSADOR TOON TO COVER SAME GROUND TO INSURE TOON WOULD HAVE PROPER RELATIONS. DINITZ ASKED IF PURPOSE OF SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE PURELY INFORMATIVE, WITH NO INITIATIVES OR NEW IDEAS TO BE RAISED IN THEM.

THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WAS CORRECT, AND NO INITIATIVES WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT BEING DISCUSSED FULLY WITH ISRAEL IN ADVANCE.

5. FAHD VISIT.

THE SECRETARY SAID SAUDI POSITION ON ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT REMAINED AS KNOWN TO ISRAELIS. SAUDIS REITERATED THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION ON BOUNDARY ISSUE AND STRESSED JERUSALEM ISSUE, WHERE THEY CONTINUE TO REGARD THEMSELVES AS KEEPERS OF THE OF THE FAITH. DINITZ ASKED IF SAUDIS CALLED FOR RETURN OF EAST JERUSALEM TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE SECRETARY SAID YES. ON PALESTINIAN QUESTION, SAUDIS ASSERTED THAT THE THREE CONFRONTATION STATES WERE ALL NOW OF POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT STATE WHICH WOULD THEN MAKE SUCH FEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS AS IT CHOSE. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED HE WAS UNSURE SAUDIS WERE CORRECT ABOUT JORDAN ADHERENCE TO THIS VIEW.

6. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED WE HAD REITERATED TO SAUDIS VERY FIRMLY U.S. ADHERENCE TO SINAI II UNDERSTANDING ON NON-RECOGNITION OF PLO. SAUDIS STATED POSITION SIMILAR TO THAT OF SOVIETS: SAUDIS SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD PLO WAS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE IN RETURN FOR ISRAELI RECOGNITION OF RIGHT OF PALESTINIANS TO HAVE INDEPENDENT STATE.

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THE SECRETARY SAID WE TOLD SAUDIS WE FEARED ANY SUCH STATE WOULD TURN RADICAL AND COME UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE. SINCE SAUDIS WANTED MIDDLE EAST STABILITY, WE ASKED HOW THEY RECONCILED THIS WITH IDEA OF PALESTINIAN STATE. SAUDIS REPLIED THEY WOULD NOT LET PALESTINIAN STATE RADICALIZE: IT WAS RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB STATES IN AREA TO PREVENT THIS. THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED SAUDIS HAD NOT EXPLAINED HOW THIS WOULD BE PREVENTED.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID SAUDI VIEW ON PEACE ISSUES WERE LESS DETAILED THAN VIEWS OF CONFRONTATION STATES. SAUDIS TOOK FAIRLY HARD LINE ABOUT ANYTHING HAPPENING IMMEDIATELY UPON SIGNING OF PEACE AGREEMENT. WE HAD ASKED SAUDIS IF STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION COULD BE PHASED IN COORDINATION WITH WITHDRAWALS TO AGREED BOUNDARIES WORKED OUT BY PARTIES. THE SECRETARY FELT SAUDI THOUGHTS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE HAZY BUT INDICATED SOME UNDERSTANDING. ATHERTON ADDED THAT FAHD HAD STATED CONVICTION THAT ONCE

INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WERE CREATED, IT WOULD  
NATURALLY DEVELOP STRONG TIES WITH JORDAN AND THAT

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BOTH ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD HAVE SECURE  
BORDERS. DINITZ NOTED WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN INDICATED  
THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION DURING FAHD VISIT  
OF BORDERS OF PALESTINIAN STATE. THE SECRETARY SAID  
SAUDIS HAD EXPRESSED THEIR VIEW SUCH STATE SHOULD  
COMPRISE WEST BANK AND GAZA. WE HAD STRESSED OUR  
VIEW SUCH MATTERS MUST BE DECIDED BY PARTIES. THE  
PRESIDENT HAD REAFFIRMED PALESTINIANS SHOULD HAVE  
HOMELAND BUT DEFINITION WAS UP TO PARTIES.

8. ON U.S.-SAUDI BILATERAL MATTERS, THE SECRETARY  
SAID SAUDIS WANTED ASSURANCE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE  
RELATIONSHIP IN SUPPLY OF SOME ARMS. WE INDICATED  
TO THEM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE AND WE WOULD  
ADHERE TO PAST COMMITMENTS. THE ADMINISTRATION  
WOULD BE PRESENTING VARIOUS TRANSACTIONS TO CONGRESS  
IN DUE COURSE. SAUDIS REITERATED THEIR POSITION  
OF NOT TYING OPEC PRICES TO SUCCESS OF MIDDLE  
EAST PEACE EFFORTS. SAUDIS WERE WORRIED ABOUT EFFECT  
OF INCREASED OIL PRICES ON POORER NATIONS. FAHD  
HAD SAID CANDIDLY THAT IF SAUDIS WERE ONLY ONES  
OPPOSING PRICE INCREASE THEY CONCEIVABLY COULD NOT  
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HOLD LINE. SAUDIS DID NOT SAY WHETHER PRICE INCREASE WAS LIKELY TO BE RESULT OF JULY MEETING; THE SECRETARY THOUGHT IF SMALL INCREASE WAS PROPOSED BY OTHERS, SAUDIS MIGHT JOIN.

9. THE SECRETARY SAID SAUDIS WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT HOW CIEC WOULD COME OUT. RELATIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES COULD PUT SAUDIS IN CONFRONTATION, WHICH WORRIED THEM, AND WHICH CONCERNED THE SECRETARY ALSO. THE SECRETARY BELIEVED PACKAGE THAT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAD PUT TOGETHER WAS FAIR BUT WOULD NOT PLEASE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WOULD SHOW UNDERSTANDING, BUT QUESTION WAS WHAT THESE MODERATES WOULD ACTUALLY DO. WHILE IN PARIS FOR CIEC, THE SECRETARY WOULD HAVE BILATERAL TALKS WITH NUMBER OF MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE HELPFUL IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT. ATHERTON NOTED SAUDIS HAD SEEMED DEEPLY PREOCCUPIED WITH SOVIETS AND WORRIED ABOUT THEIR GAINING ADVANTAGE ANYWHERE IN WORLD. DINITZ ASKED IF SAUDIS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT U.S. AGREEMENT TO HOLD REGULAR MEETINGS WITH DOBRYNIN ON MIDDLE EAST. THE SECRETARY REPLIED FAHD RECOGNIZED SOVIETS COULD BE SPOILERS IN MIDDLE EAST AND U.S. NEEDED TO CONTAIN THEM, AND HE ACCEPTED U.S. WORD THAT THIS WAS PURPOSE OF MONTHLY MEETINGS.

10. SOVIET JEWRY: PODGORNYY DISMISSAL.

11. DINITZ ASKED IF IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE SECRETARY TO RAISE ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWRY WITH GROMYKO, AND THE SECRETARY REPLIED THERE HAD BEEN NO OPPORTUNITY. DINITZ ASKED IF THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN ABLE SUBSEQUENTLY TO RAISE WITH DOBRYNIN SPECIFIC CASES OF SHARANSKIY AND BEGUN WHICH ALLON HAD ASKED HIM TO RAISE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED

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AFFIRMATIVELY. WHEN DINITZ ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, THE SECRETARY REPLIED HE HONESTLY DID NOT KNOW. DINITZ SAID ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT POSITION OF SOVIET JEWS WAS APPROACHING WORST SITUATION IN STALINIST ERA. THE SECRETARY SAID DOBRYNIN HAD POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION DURING FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF THIS YEAR WAS ABOUT THE

SAME AS DURING SAME PERIOD ONE YEAR AGO. DINITZ REPLIED IT WAS TRUE THAT ALREADY BAD RATE OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION HAD STABILIZED, BUT IT WAS DETERIORATION OF SITUATION OF JEWS INSIDE USSR THAT ALARMED HIS GOVERNMENT. THE SECRETARY NOTED HE DID RAISE THIS SUBJECT WHEN IN MOSCOW.

12. DINITZ ASKED WHAT SIGNIFICANCE THE SECRETARY SAW IN PODGORNÝ DISMISSAL. THE SECRETARY REPLIED PODGORNÝ HAD BEEN IN TROUBLE SINCE LAST PARTY CONGRESS NOT ONLY WITH BREZHNEV BUT ALSO WITH MIDDLE LEVEL IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THEY FELT PODGORNÝ HAD NOT BEEN COOPERATIVE OR DOING GOOD JOB AND THAT HE HAD BEEN OPPOSING DETENTE STEPS AND NEW CONSTITUTION. THEY WERE UNHAPPY WITH HIS LAST TRIP TO AFRICA

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WHERE HE HAD BEEN HEAVYHANDED. SO HIS DEPARTURE FROM SCENE WAS COMBINATION OF THINGS. THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN TOLD THAT IN BROAD SENSE THIS EVENT DID NOT HAVE POLICY IMPLICATIONS, EXCEPT THAT PODGORNÝ HAD BEEN NEGATIVE ON SENIOR LEADERSHIP'S DESIRED LINES.

13. US POSTURE ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

14. DINITZ SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY PRIME MINISTER

AND FOREIGN MINISTER TO RAISE WITH THE SECRETARY ISRAELI CONCERN OVER SOME RECENT U.S. STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS OF THOSE STATEMENTS. WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAD INDICATED THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSIONS OF BOUNDARIES OF PALESTINIAN STATE AND OF ISRAEL DURING FAHD VISIT. THE SECRETARY SAID THE SPOKESMAN PROBABLY MEANT SAUDIS HAD TOLD US THEY THOUGHT PALESTINIAN STATE SHOULD COMPRISE WEST BANK AND GAZA. DINITZ CONTINUED WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN NEXT DAY EXPRESSED CONFUSED VIEW ON MEANING OF RESOLUTION 242. THE PRESIDENT AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE HAD SAID PAST PREMISES WHICH WERE SPELLED OUT BY SECRET

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U.N. RESOLUTIONS THAT WERE SUPPORTED BY THE U.S. INCLUDED RIGHT OF PALESTINIANS TO HAVE HOMELAND. EXPLANATION WHICH WAS POSTED MADE THINGS WORSE FOR ISRAEL BY INVOKING RESOLUTIONS 181 AND 194, WHICH WERE NOT BASIS FOR ANY MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS. DINITZ HAD BEEN ASKED TO REEMPHASIZE THAT ISRAEL SAW ONLY RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AS AGREED BASIS BETWEEN U.S. AND ISRAEL AND BETWEEN PARTIES. ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT INTRODUCTION OF OLD UNGA RESOLUTIONS.

15. DINITZ SAID HE ALSO WAS INSTRUCTED TO EMPHASIZE ISRAELI POSITIONS SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MIS-UNDERSTANDING: RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 DID NOT CALL FOR (A) PALESTINIAN HOMELAND, (B) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES, OR (C) COMPENSATION FOR PALESTINIANS. INSTEAD, THESE RESOLUTIONS CONTAINED FOUR PRINCIPLES WHICH ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED: (A) PEACE WITHIN RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES, (B) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES, (C) FREEDOM FROM NAVIGATION, AND (D) JUST SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM. RESOLUTION DID NOT SPEAK OF ONLY ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM, AS IT WAS REALIZED THERE WAS MORE THAN ONE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. PROPERTY LOSSES OF JEWISH REFUGEES FROM ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED.

16. THE SECRETARY ASKED EXACTLY HOW ISRAEL DEFINED "WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM AREAS OCCUPIED IN RECENT CONFLICT." DINITZ REPLIED THIS DID NOT MEAN WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES: LOCATION OF LINE TO WHICH ISRAEL WAS TO WITHDRAW WAS SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION, AND RESOLUTION 242 DID NOT PREJUDGE QUESTION. THERE WERE TWO OTHER DRAFT RESOLUTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN NOVEMBER 1967, BOTH CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES, AND THEY WERE REJECTED. AUTHORS OF RESOLUTION 242, CARADON AND



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GOLDBERG, CLARIFIED AT THAT TIME IT DID NOT MEAN

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TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES. THROUGHOUT SUBSEQUENT YEARS U.S. ADHEARED TO POSITION THAT U.S. WOULD NOT SPECIFY WHERE BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE AND THAT 1967 LINES WERE NEITHER EXCLUDED NOR PRESCRIBED.

17. THE SECRETARY READ TO DINITZ TEXT OF STATEMENT BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN MAY 27 REAFFIRMING THAT U.S. CONSIDERED RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AS BASIS FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. DINITZ SAID STATEMENT HAD HELPED. MATTER WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD GOVERNMENT INTRANSITION. FUTURE GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONSIDER POSITIONS WITH WHICH U.S. WOULD NOT AGREE, BUT PRESENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HELD SAME POSITIONS AS BEFORE, WHICH WERE SHARED BY 95 PERCENT OF ISRAELI ELECTORATE.

18. ISRAELI POLITICAL SITUATION.

19. REPLYING TO SECRETARY, DINITZ SAID THAT SHMUEL KATZ WAS ONE-MAN LIKUD DELEGATION TO U.S. WHO WOULD TRY TO EXPLAIN LIKUD VIEWS AS PERSONAL ENVOY OF BEGIN. ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ASKED  
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ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO FACILITATE VISIT. KATZ WOULD MEET IN NEW YORK WITH JOURNALISTS AND IN WASHINGTON WOULD ANSWER QUESTIONS OFF RECORD AT SESSION AT DINITZ RESIDENCE AS WELL AS DISCUSS ISSUES WITH PRESS COMMENTATORS AT LUNCH BEING HOSTED BY ISRAELI DCM. DINITZ THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WISE IF EVERYONE RESERVED JUDGEMENT ON ISRAELI POLICIES UNTIL NEW GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED, WITH WHICH THE SECRETARY AGREED.  
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## Message Attributes

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